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This paper draws a distinction between ways thinking and acting, and  
hence of policy and practice in higher education, in terms of different  
kinds of economy: economies of exchange and economies of excess.  
Crucial features of economies of exchange are outlined and their  
presence in prevailing conceptions of teaching and learning is  
illustrated. These are contrasted with other possible forms of practice,  
which in turn bring to light the nature of an economy of excess. In more  
philosophical terms, and to expand on the picture, economies of excess  
are elaborated with reference, first, to the understanding of alterity in  
the work of Emmanuel Levinas and, second, to the idea of Dionysian 
intensity that is to be found in Nietzsche. In the light of critical comment  
on some current directions in policy and practice, the implications of  
these ways of thinking for the administrator, the teacher and the student  
in higher education are explored. 
The purpose of this paper is to assert a simple distinction, to show how this is 
manifested in higher education and then to examine ways in which a release 
from the hegemony of the dominant pole in this distinction opens the way to 
better practice in higher education. My concern is with different economies, 
though not primarily with economy in the familiar financial sense. It is with 
economies as ways of thinking and acting. My first task then is to identify a 
contrast within these.
Two economies
There are many ways in which human relationships are properly understood in 
terms of exchange. You lend me ten pounds today, and I agree to pay it back 
tomorrow. I pay it back and the debt is settled. I invite you to give a lecture at 
my university on a particular occasion. Having accepted, you come along at the 
appointed time and present your lecture. You have fulfilled your commitment. I 
undertake to teach a particular class, which involves marking the essays the 
students write, being available to them during my ‘office hours’, attending the 
examiners’ meeting, collecting course evaluation forms, and so on, and I do all 
this meticulously. At the end of the year my work is completed. You agree to sit 
on a committee on widening participation, turn up to its meetings having read 
the relevant papers, make appropriate contributions to discussion, and you have 
discharged your function. So too we might think of students, who enrol on a 
module, identify the assessment requirements, complete the necessary 
coursework assignments and revise sufficiently to answer the requisite number 
of questions in the examination, and satisfy expectations of attendance. They 
return their library books, and the course is completed, leaving them ready to 
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proceed to the next module. A compact with a school matches the opportunity 
of a place at university with the commitment to study, the school’s preparation 
of nominated students with the university’s preparedness to accept them. A 
contract with an employer matches investment in learning with the delivery of a 
course.
These are all forms of exchange in what we might think of as a closed 
economy, an economy that totalises the field of concern. They have their 
counterparts at the level of course design, lesson planning and teaching quality 
assessment. A course establishes clearly its aims and objectives, specified 
probably in terms of learning outcomes. Teaching is devised so that the most 
efficient means is taken to enabling students to achieve these outcomes. The 
process, ideally, is transparent to students so that they are encouraged to direct 
their efforts towards the most efficient ways of reaching these ends. They are 
encouraged perhaps to identify their own preferred learning styles so that none 
of the effort they put into the course is squandered. In fact nothing that happens 
in the classroom, or for that matter in other aspects of their study for this course, 
will be extraneous to these clearly specified purposes. Assessment is strictly 
geared to the learning outcomes, which place the emphasis heavily on skills, 
and students are tested against all of these. Quality assurance is facilitated by 
the fact that what the teachers and the learners are required to do will be fully 
specified; the success in achieving the course objectives is transparent to 
scrutiny, providing clear measures of performance and means of comparison 
with rival institutions.
That these are forms of exchange conditioned by a closed economy can 
be seen if we consider for a moment what they rule out. Let us begin by 
considering the perspective of the university lecturer. Suppose that in designing 
her course she has in mind a certain body of work that she wants to acquaint her 
students with – it might be a certain set of texts in a humanities subject, for 
example, or perhaps the possibilities of a particular range of techniques in art 
and design, or again some aspects of the principles of suspension bridge 
construction in civil engineering. She has, let us assume, some sense of the 
value and fascination of these things, whether they are vocationally useful or 
not: they are the occasion for the acquisition of knowledge on the part of 
students but also for the exercise of imaginative thought; and one of the reasons 
she teaches in a university is, after all, that she is enthusiastic about these things, 
or, if you like, has a love for her subject. She thinks it entirely reasonable that 
forms of assessment should be devised that fairly reflect the kinds of things that 
her students learn in the course of their study, seeing this as providing feedback 
to her students and recognition of their ability and achievement, indicators of 
this for potential employers, and evidence of the effects of her own teaching that 
may help her to adjust and improve it – indeed she sees assessment in some 
form or other as integral to teaching. What she does not accept is that 
assessment must be exhaustive: the presumption that the teaching and learning 
that takes place on the course can only be justified to the extent that it satisfies 
learning outcome requirements has the effect of stifling aspects of the course 
she is teaching that she sees as vital to its life. Indeed a further consequence 
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follows from this, so she believes: that those same learning outcomes are 
themselves likely to be less fully realised if they are not contextualised within 
the broader, more open-ended approach she favours. 
From the perspective of the student a similar story can be told. Suppose 
that a student signs up for a module with some enthusiasm. The opening lecture 
is lively enough, and a visit to the library secures a small collection of the books 
and articles on the reading list. The student sets about reading these with some 
enthusiasm. Looking at the course guide, however, he finds that in order to 
satisfy the requirements of this module, he is required to complete two 
coursework essays, chosen from a list of ten items. On discussing the various 
options with other students, he finds out that several of them have sized up the 
situation and others are following suit: all you need to do is to read the books 
relevant to the topics you are going to write about; anything else is a waste, as it 
will take up time that could have been spent improving the essays you will be 
judged on. Once those essays are done, there is not really any point in going to 
the lectures any more; in fact, once you have general idea of what the topic is 
about, it probably makes sense to go only to the lectures that are directly about 
the topics you have chosen. Our conscientious student finds his enthusiasm 
somewhat dulled by this. He had been hoping that the course would open up 
new ways of thinking for him, and still, he supposes, it might, but there is a kind 
of inexorable logic about what the others say: they are perhaps just more 
pragmatic and realistic than he has been, and he does not want to make the 
mistake of spreading his efforts too thinly or of directing his energies 
inappropriately of getting too carried away with things so that he loses sight of 
what is required. When he sets about the writing of his assignments, however, 
once again he finds himself deflated. He reads the guidance about completing 
assignments in the course guide to find that what he has to do in order to 
achieve a particular grade is to meet the criteria that are set out there. The more 
wised-up students tell him he must give back to the lecturers the answers that 
they anticipate, which they will have carefully accentuated in their lectures; it is 
these that will tally with their marking schemes, and anything that he does 
beyond this, however brilliant this may be, is likely to fall through the system.
There is a crucial difference between the perspectives of teachers and 
students over this. Our university lecturer, we are imagining, has a robust sense 
of how things might be different. She may have gained this through her own 
experience of higher education, in less busy and quite possibly more privileged 
times. Or she may have caught some sense of what teaching and learning can be 
about from, for example, reading of the formative educational experiences of 
people she admires and who have influenced her, or perhaps her familiarity with 
particular kinds of literature. She may simply have a more intuitive grasp of 
these things, born perhaps of her fascination with the pursuit of her subject. 
There may be subject-specific qualities to the experience of teaching and 
learning that she has enjoyed – say, the thrill of carrying out a successful 
laboratory experiment, or perhaps the confidence gained as one begins 
tentatively to participate in its research seminars. Our student, in contrast, is as 
yet on the other side of this experience – that is, the outside of this subject, or of 
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this aspect of the subject. The person we have in mind – evidently more than the 
others who are taking this module – seems, on the face of it, to be receptive 
enough to the possibilities that the subject may open up. But he is also learning 
something of what education is about, and a fortiori what this subject is about, 
by the expectations that the course places on him and by the position that others 
– his fellow students and his teachers – occupy in relation to this. In a real sense 
he is learning what education amounts to. A further consideration is relevant 
here too. This is that there will be many new staff who, unlike the university 
lecturer we have been considering, are themselves still learning what higher 
education is about. Of course, they will have had their own experience as 
students, but when they find themselves faced with the anxious demands of 
quality assurance systems set up to ensure a more ‘professional’ approach to 
teaching, not to mention their own anxieties about establishing themselves as 
researchers, they are likely to be impressionable and to acquiesce all too 
uncritically in the economy of teaching and learning sketched above.
It is worth bringing a further player into the scene we have been 
developing, and this is the university administrator – the dean, the pro-vice-
chancellor, the manager perhaps. With university funding increasingly affected 
by systems of quality control, it is incumbent upon the administrator to take all 
reasonable steps to try to gain good ratings. Achieving the best ratings is likely, 
as far as teaching and learning are concerned, to require not so much excellence 
as a vigilance against slip-ups, and a judicious containment of risk. Vision in the 
manager will be welcomed, but this will need to be formulated in the 
university’s mission statement, and evidenced in the measures of good practice 
against which its credibility will be judged. In other words it will be subject to 
the same closed economy. The manager whose vision genuinely exceeds these 
terms will probably recognise that she needs to ‘play the system’, which is 
hardly likely to do anything other than compromise and distort whatever it is 
she intends. 
Some five decades ago the playwright John Osborne, despairing of the 
moribund state into which British theatre had lapsed in the post-War years, 
wrote satirically of what he called ‘the well-made play’: the curtains are drawn 
upon the scene of an Edwardian drawing room, a telephone rings, the butler 
enters and answers. . . . The creaking exposition and formulaic plot are safely 
underway. And although the audience may be satisfied enough, the effects are 
ultimately soporific. In certain respects the closed economy of teaching and 
learning is to be found in ‘the well-made lesson’, with its symmetry of 
objectives and method. The ‘well-run university’, quality assured, replicates this 
through the institution as a whole. In the ‘well-run virtual university’ this tidy 
economy of teaching and learning dovetails perfectly with the databases and 
spreadsheets of ICT.
I have established this distinction in a way that reveals where my 
sympathies lie. I make no apologies about this on the grounds that to see the 
distinction is, I believe, necessarily to understand the shortcomings of the closed 
economy. The problem is precisely that many people cannot think outside these 
terms. There is something curiously self-reinforcing, self-perpetuating and, for 
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some, seductive about this entire way of thinking. To justify claims, or at least 
to render it more plausible, I need now to look at more philosophical ways in 
which this distinction has been elaborated.
Beyond the economy of exchange and satisfaction
A valuable lead into this is provided if we take what may seem to be a step 
away from the matter at hand and turn to an aspect of the question of exchange 
that has preoccupied a number of thinkers over the past century and that has 
been especially prominent in poststructuralist philosophy: the idea of the gift. 
The paradox of the gift has to do with the various ways in which gift-giving 
seems itself to slide into a kind of exchange. This is most obviously the case 
with the reciprocal giving of presents, of course; the point is driven home when 
one remembers the protocols of pricing what one gives according the 
relationship to the person, and according to the probable cost of what one is to 
receive in return! But where giving is not reciprocated in this way, there are 
other forms of reward or recompense: the gratitude of the recipient, delight in 
the pleasure that one has given. Even where the donation is anonymous, the 
giver is prone to a kind of satisfaction, if not to a kind of hubris, in having done 
good. In short, the pure gift, untainted by these factors comes to seem an 
impossibility, and hence the paradox of giving: a gift is not a (pure) gift, and yet 
giving is not something we should give up on but something we should aspire to 
do. It is in relation to this impossibility of giving that giving is given its sense. 
We should live conscientiously with its impossibility – still endeavouring, that 
is, to give - for to give up on this is to acquiesce or subside into mere exchange. 
It is the very fact that we do not lose sight of this impossibility that saves us 
from that closed economy. Teaching and learning, as our opening distinction 
perhaps begins to suggest, and as we shall further see below, can fruitfully be 
understood in terms of this impossibility.1 We might think of this as redolent of 
a kind of perfectionism, where the sanguine recognition of the impossibility of 
the perfectibility of our actual circumstances does not dull the sense of a 
perfection to which we should aspire.
In a more philosophical idiom, a broader and more culturally pervasive 
basis for the position I am developing here can be provided if we turn to a 
distinction drawn by Emmanuel Levinas. In a 1957 essay, ‘Philosophy and the 
Idea of Infinity’, he identifies two directions that the philosophical spirit can 
take. This requires us to imagine two ways of thinking in and of doing 
philosophy, but also by implication two kinds of orientation towards life. In the 
first the thinker maintains, Levinas explains, a relation distinct from him, other 
than him. It involves a movement that must lead us beyond the nature that 
surrounds us and towards a beyond: it goes towards the stranger, and extends in 
a kind of perfectionism towards the divine. This is heteronomy itself. Levinas 
identifies this thinking in terms of a relation to infinity.  In the second, the 
thinker freely assents to propositions that are then incorporated in such a way 
that his nature is preserved: it thereby brings into the same what was other. It 
moves towards a kind of autonomy in which nothing irreducible would limit 
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thought. Disparate and diverse events are incorporated into a history; this might 
be seen as ‘the conquest of being by man over the course of history’.2 This is a 
thinking in terms of totality.
It is the distinction between totality and infinity, of course, that becomes 
the guiding idea in his major work of that name.3 Crucial to this book is 
Levinas’s abiding preoccupation with questions of alterity, and in the course of 
it he develops the ethical distinction between the relation to others and the 
relation to the Other. The latter is usually marked by an initial capital to indicate 
an absolute relation to the other person, independent of particular 
characteristics, of factors that might differentiate this person from that person. 
Of course, there are ethical questions that relate to such differentiating factors – 
questions of social justice (say, to do with race or disability or the distribution of 
wealth between social classes), of obligations relating to specific roles or 
situations, and so on. But these operate on what might be thought of as a 
horizontal axis. Quasi-contractual in nature, they are understood as part of an 
economy of exchange, and rightly so. One can discharge one’s obligations, 
satisfy needs, settle one’s debts, etc., in such a closed economy, and this is an 
economy that can be totalised or regarded comprehensively.
Thinking in terms of exchange is then inevitably and desirably a part of 
our ordinary lives, but it can also encroach on them too much and take on 
distorted forms. The effects of this are to deny a more fundamental relation, on 
what might be thought of as a vertical axis, the economy of which is, as it were, 
scandalous to modern thought - to ways of thinking characterised by exchange. 
The vertical is the vertiginous dimension of an obligation that deepens the more 
I answer to it, where I am singularised in this responsibility.
Some further examples may help to illustrate the consequences of this 
denial. Think first of the responsible parent who, having paid for the good 
school, bought clothing of decent quality, and provided nourishing food, feels 
that she has fully discharged her obligations. Imagine the dutiful citizen who, 
having paid her taxes, voted whenever required and never broken the law, is 
satisfied that she has acquitted herself in a responsible way, that she is a decent 
citizen. So too, we can imagine the diligent teacher whose class has been 
assiduously prepared for their Standard Achievement Tests, who now goes 
home content that she has done her job efficiently and effectively. Star 
professors in universities, notching up the esteem indicators of citations, 
research grants, keynotes and appearances on TV in preparation for the 
forthcoming Research Assessment Exercise, take smug satisfaction in the stars 
they gain. And the wised-up student who, identifying the performance criteria, 
has picked off her assignments, meeting their requirements in full is ready to 
close her books on this module and this course, the latest addition to her 
learning portfolio. But we can imagine, can we not, also that each of these might 
become moral grotesques, whose characteristic vice is perhaps hubris? Is there 
not something virtuous about the parent (the parent, the citizen, the teacher, the 
lover . . .) who feels that she has never done enough, who has some sense of the 
infinite possibilities of her relation to the other. Is not the person who does not 
see things like this in danger of getting the whole thing wrong – and precisely 
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missing the point of citizenship, parenthood, love or education? Is there not 
something morally repugnant about the parent who thinks she has done enough? 
Might we not expect a lover of learning to exceed the currency of star ratings 
and CVs? Recognising this opens the way perhaps to thinking further of what 
this absolute relation to the Other might mean for higher education. 
Alterity
It is important to realise that Levinas’s account of the relation to the Other 
involves something other than the terms of Martin Buber’s I-thou relation. The 
relation, first, is not symmetrical. The first person usage, as both Kierkegaard 
and Wittgenstein had both earlier emphasised, is crucial in ethics, such that ‘I 
am responsible to you’ is not to be understood to imply an equivalent 
responsibility on your part, or on his or hers. The relation is something that 
singularises me: my absolute obligation to the Other is not something that I can 
pass up or pass on. Levinas quotes Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov: ‘Everyone is 
guilty, but I am more guilty than the others.’ This breaks loose, it should be 
clear, from any economy of mutuality or reciprocation. The relation, second, is 
not one of cognition, and hence not one of recognition. The Other comes to me 
as having depths that I cannot know, and in order not to do violence I must 
acknowledge this unknowability, a negativity at the heart of things. This is the 
ethical relation par excellence. In contrast to the totalities or closed economies 
of the horizontal axis, this (vertical) axis points to infinity. Of critical 
importance, for Levinas, is the fact that, if this fundamental relation to the Other 
is overridden, the relations to others on the horizontal plane will also be 
corrupted. Quasi-contractual obligations, etc., are not understood correctly if the 
economies within which they operate are not ultimately given their sense by the 
different terms of this infinite relation – hence the poverty of the self-satisfied 
citizen, parent, teacher or lover. A student, let us remember, is originally a lover 
(Latin, studere – to love).
It is fairly common ground amongst readers of Levinas that the Other is 
to be understood in human terms – that is, as a human being. But there is a 
danger in putting the emphasis on the human being in this way in that the 
human comes to be understood in terms of the personal. Where the personal is 
construed as appertaining to this particular person with this person’s 
distinguishing characteristics, or, say, to this particular oppressed group with its 
defining characteristics, this is a further distortion. It is to miss the permeation 
of experience by the relation to the human, however much this may be hidden or 
denied – a permeation in ways that go beyond, and are qualitatively different 
from, what we might think of as the personal or as matters of interpersonal 
relations. One consequence of this is that certain aspects of the educational 
purchase of Levinas’s account are lost. Let us pause for a moment over a series 
of remarks from Totality and Infinity in which the complex interconnections of 
teaching, language and alterity may become evident:
The presence of the Other, or expression, source of all signification, is 
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not contemplated as an intelligible essence, but is heard as language, and 
thereby is effectuated exteriorly.4
Language effectuates the entry of things into a new ether in which they 
receive a name and become concepts. . . The analyses of language that 
tend to present it as one meaningful action among others fail to 
recognize this offering of the world, this offering of contents which 
answers to the face of the Other or which questions him, and first opens 
the perspective of the meaningful.5
The voice coming from another shore teaches transcendence itself. 
Teaching signifies the whole infinity of exteriority. . . [The Other’s] 
alterity is manifested in a mastery that does not conquer, but teaches. 
Teaching is not a species of a genus called domination, a hegemony at 
work within a totality, but is the presence of infinity breaking the closed 
circle of totality.6
The relation to the Other is definitely not to be captured in those rare moments 
of intimacy when one gazes into the depths of someone’s eyes. In contrast, we 
see here Levinas’s emphasis on the fact that the Other is heard as language, that 
language constitutes the very opening of the perspective of the meaningful, and 
that this offering of language, this voice, teaches in such a way as to breach the 
circle of exchange. Levinas says sometimes that the relation to the Other is very 
rare: but it is rare not in the manner of ‘peak experiences’ but rare in that we 
rarely live up to its demands; it is through forms of denial that we hide its 
subtending of our lives.
What is taught, in higher education especially, should not be conceived 
in terms of banks of knowledge or transferable skills or competences of 
whatever kind. Michael Oakeshott was closer to the mark when he spoke of 
learning a subject as the initiation into a conversation, a conversation of which 
we are the inheritors:
Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and 
partnership of this conversation in which we learn to recognize the 
voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we 
acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation. 
And it is this conversation which, in the end, gives place and character to 
every human utterance.7 
In fact subjects of study can never be rightly understood as brute facts about the 
world or as free-floating skills: they are always in some sense linguistically 
constituted practices. Indeed what other kinds of practice can there be? And 
they are no less substantial for this. Does not this ‘conversation’ underline the 
nature of curriculum as language?
Hence, however much our economies of teaching and learning may hide 
this fact, the subjects of the curriculum constitute an offering of language that, 
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by its very nature, breaches those forms of closure. And our choice – in what we 
teach and how we teach it, in what we study and how this is pursued, and in the 
manner in which all this is assessed – comes down to an acquiescence in forms 
of denial and an openness to the infinite possibilities that education otherwise 
occasions. That there are practical implications here, not only for the education 
of students but for the improvement of teaching and research, can scarcely be in 
doubt.
The account of alterity in Levinas’s thought enables, further, the 
realisation in teaching and learning of a kind of objectivity in which we are 
freed from what Iris Murdoch called the ‘anxious avaricious tentacles of the 
self’. In this, as we have begun to see, ideas of responsibility can come to be 
understood not only as involving personal relationships but as extending to a 
responsiveness and answerability to the objects of study, to the content of 
learning, to the subjects to which we are subject. Rather than a body of 
knowledge or skills to be mastered, a subject of study comes to be understood as 
deepening and expanding the more one pursues it: as with the vista that extends 
as one ascends the mountainside, one progresses towards a greater 
understanding of what there is still to learn. From outside one scarcely 
understands the problems. There is nothing fanciful about this: this is the 
familiar experience of people who love their subjects; and against it so many 
aspects of current policy and practice, and of the prevailing discourse of 
teaching, learning and research methods, look palely narcissistic. But the very 
possibility of expressing this is surreptitiously excised by that discourse. There 
is a danger that the possibility of thinking this will be lost too. 
The contrast between totality and infinity provides one way of 
recognising an orientation to education that exceeds the closed economy of 
teaching and learning. With its stress on alterity and responsibility, it is 
characterised by a kind of orientation towards service, in which the teacher and 
the student are in service of the subject, and in which one models this for the 
other. It is important to realise, however, that there are other economies of 
excess that similarly breach the cramped terms of the understanding of learning 
and teaching sketched at the start. In order to see something of the possibilities 
here, we need to turn away from relations of alterity and towards another kind 
of overcoming of the self – this time not in subordination to the Other but in the 
experience of flow and intensity. This is once again to escape our anti-educative 
impulses towards various forms of self-absorption.   
Intensity
The economy of excess we have been considering is characterised by an 
obligation or responsibility that deepens the more you answer to it. In what 
follows excess functions through desire. But unlike the classical understanding 
of desire as correlative to lack, and hence as in principle satisfiable, this is a 
desire that intensifies the more it is pursued. The guiding thoughts here are 
Nietzsche’s.
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In The Birth of Tragedy, his first revaluation of all values, Nietzsche 
draws a distinction between the Dionysian forces of Ancient Greek tragedy and 
the Apollonian form and clarity of Socratic dialectic. The former is 
characterised by surging energy unleashed in anarchic ways, impulse alike to 
creativity and destruction; the latter by pure form and the ordering of logical 
thought and faith in reason. With the advent of Socrates, or to be more precise, 
of a certain ‘Socratism’ – which is neither the position of the historical Socrates 
nor that revealed in Plato’s account – the possibility of bearing witness in the 
manner of tragic drama is eroded, and the lives we live become thinner as a 
result. There is an optimism to the arguments and counter-arguments of the 
dialectic, a faith in the progress of reasoned enquiry, that progressively invades 
tragedy and forces ‘its death-leap into bourgeois theatre’.8 
The product of this Socratism in the modern age is ‘abstract man’ – 
‘abstract education, abstract morality, abstract justice, the abstract state’.9 If we 
transpose this to conditions of postmodernity, we find that ‘abstract education’ 
is further refined in the proceduralism, coding and performativity of higher 
education.10 Instrumental reason and managerialism, as it were, stage-manage 
the curriculum in what have become its rituals of presentation, communication, 
assessment and accounting. The ideal product of such an education is a being 
with a portfolio of transferable skills, a being with a set of masks to put on, 
appropriately listed in a record of achievement and instantly recognisable to 
employers. The optimism of the beliefs that for every problem there is an 
appropriate technical solution, that human knowledge accumulates without 
limit, that understanding is possible only where things are fully available to 
scrutiny has as a correlate a kind of plundering and display of other cultures – as 
theme parks and the heritage industry suggest, and as the burgeoning of the 
virtual world reveals. Multiculturalism is thematised as a series of spectacles, 
foreign travel a collection of packaged experiences. Modern epistemology 
grasps knowledge, containing it in the concept, so that the knowledge economy 
can then turn it into a commodity fit for exchange. Criticism is the business of 
the student’s crib, of book reviews in the Sunday papers, and of late night 
television arts magazines. The plundering and display divert attention from the 
vacuousness of the culture in which such ideas thrive, a vacuousness for which 
psychotherapy and New Age spirituality are scant compensation. Hence, the 
economy of exchange in education – that is, in ‘the well-run university’ - 
involves a ‘bourgeois’ theatricalisation of standards, quality and excellence. 
Practice becomes contrived and self-conscious, staged and presented as the 
object of accountability’s gaze. The words ‘learning’ and ‘education’ are uttered 
with thespian gravitas. 
While, in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche already asserts that 
‘Everything that we now call culture, education and civilization will one day 
appear before that infallible judge, Dionysos’11, in later work the conviction 
becomes still stronger, with the emphasis less on sublime recognition and on a 
balancing of forces and more on the affirmation of life in the upsurge of energy 
and passionate absorption. The bourgeois denial of these Dionysian energies 
brings with it ressentiment – feeling that is, as it were, turned back upon itself. 
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Such a description might fit the restrictive and debilitating machinery of 
accountability and the conception of teaching and learning that are at issue in 
this essay. 
But if this is the force of the negative charge, what of a more positive 
nature might these thoughts imply? In what ways in higher education might 
there be found the desire that intensifies the more it is pursued? The Dionysian 
can break through in multiple and subtle ways. To show how this is so, let me 
appeal, more prosaically, so it may seem, to certain still familiar aspects of the 
experience of teaching and learning.
The experience of writing an essay begins for many students with 
procrastination, avoidance and hesitation. Perhaps a plan is sketched, then 
modified, then abandoned. A few desultory sentences are typed up, but the work 
is avoided until another day. At one sitting, however, there comes a point where 
the words start to flow, and the student, almost in spite of herself, so it seems, 
suddenly finds that an hour has gone past while she has been writing, an hour 
not noticed, and that she is in the thick of the argument. Forgetting the time and 
the multiple distractions, she is now intent on carrying on. She finds herself 
preoccupied with this work and eager to get back to it when she is away, and for 
a while, at least, this intensity is sustained. In the best case, the one we are most 
concerned with, this will not result only in a satisfaction at having completed, 
say, the requirements for this module but in a kind of exuberance that gives her 
a desire for more. In a similar vein, we can imagine the researcher struggling 
with the lows and highs of progress on a different time-scale, perhaps over the 
course of an entire career. Sometimes, to be sure, the work will falter, and 
sometimes there will be despair, but it is in the context of this dynamic 
engagement that the Dionysian breaks through, carrying her forward, 
intensifying her commitment.
The recurrent motif for this Dionysian intensity is the whirl of the ring of 
dancers – Matisse’s La Danse captures just this. Who can tell the dancer from 
the dance? But, as these examples begin to show, energy and intensity can pulse 
also through quiet and solitary experience: fascination of the engineer with the 
machine’s precision, contemplation of the work of art, puzzlement over a 
mathematical equation, peculiar turbulence excited by a philosophical problem
—all are typified by this intense absorption.
It is also a part of the experience of teaching and learning. Many will 
remember the teachers who have influenced them most not in terms of, let us 
say, their efficiency in meeting the objectives of the course (though this is not to 
deny gratitude to teachers who get us through examinations) but through the 
way they drew their students into their enthusiasm, so that the students came to 
share that enthusiasm. In contrast to the Socratism that Nietzsche condemns, 
and quite unlike modern notions of ‘Socratic method’, this is the stuff of Plato’s 
dialogues. So too most teachers, in universities and beyond, will have had some 
experience of classes that have ‘gone well’ – that is to say, where the experience 
of the class in some way or other, and perhaps unforeseeably, picked up speed. 
Maybe this was a carefully planned class where the material in question was 
handled adroitly by the teacher so that its intrinsic power absorbed the students. 
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Maybe it was a class that took an unpredictable turn, but where success 
depended crucially on the teacher’s sense that this was the remark to pick up on, 
this the chance to pursue. Such occasions may have involved excited discussion 
in a seminar or concentrated work on a group project or perhaps discoveries on 
the World Wide Web. But it may also occur in the lecture-room, where only the 
lecturer is speaking and where the students are listening in silence and rapt 
attention. What these occasions have in common is an intense engagement with 
what is studied, where the students are drawn into this through the work of the 
teacher. Sometimes this results from the teacher’s charisma or flamboyant style, 
sometimes from a more measured restraint or withdrawal, sometimes from 
provocation, and sometimes from allowing the work in question to speak for 
itself. The good teacher comes in a variety of forms. And there can be no recipe, 
for so much depends upon the teacher’s judgement: in interacting with the class, 
in constructing and delivering the lecture, in responding to the rhythms of the 
occasion. . . So much depends upon good timing. The teacher must be a 
sensitive conductor of the intensity generated in the friction of engagement with 
what is taught. There is no single way in which this is done well. Thus, instead 
of a set of predetermined skills or competences that can be prescribed, good 
teaching requires something more like Aristotelian practical reason - doing the 
right thing, at the right time, in the right circumstances, where the good teacher 
is in part the orchestrator of these circumstances – but also something less 
centred, more exposed and perhaps more vulnerable, more open to the event. 
There is no recipe, but this does not mean that, for the aspiring or practicing 
teacher nothing can be learned: such abilities are gained through attending to 
examples of good practice and through readiness to learn from these. They can 
be fostered also by attending to precisely the account that is presented here and 
to the way that it challenges easier assumptions about teaching and learning.
A further avenue to understanding what is at stake here is to be found in 
Gordon Bearn’s outstanding essay ‘Pointlessness and the University of Beauty’, 
which vividly and imaginatively conveys the possibilities of these intensities of 
experience.12 Following fault-lines in the work of Jean-François Lyotard, which 
in some ways reflect the distinction drawn here between intensity and alterity, 
Bearn entertains the idea of the University of Beauty, to be imagined as 
contrasting with the University of the Sublime.
Bearn's exploitation of the classic contrast between the beautiful and the 
sublime serves to turn the attention to questions of intensity and rhythm. In a 
flagrant violation of the principles of ‘outcomes based education’, beauty 
becomes linked to an ideal of pointlessness. On the strength of this, intensity is 
to be achievable via two routes. It can come most obviously through the kind of 
subtraction or lack of connection that is involved in concentration – as perhaps 
in absorption in a problem in pure mathematics. But it can also occur through 
something like addition where the object of the study is connected in countless 
ways, and where, in contrast to representational thinking with its positive and 
negative terms, thought flows in affirmation as along a Moebius strip, with no 
other side:
12
Formlessness and pointlessness move us in this direction not towards 
emptiness, but towards a beauteous intensity. This is what the other side 
of representation is: swarms of differences, swarms of intensities, a 
world without identity. And in its pointlessness, beauty will recover its 
autonomy, but this time, not by negation. This time beauty’s autonomy 
derives not from its lack of connection, but from the myriad lines 
connecting it from here to everywhere.13
Our representational practices and genres of discourse regiment and stifle this 
intensity, staging it and stopping its flows. Beauteous intensity, in contrast, is to 
be imagined in terms of the intersecting lines of a multi-dimensional graph, the 
lines pulling their intersections along multiple dimensions. Bearn pictures 
Leonardo’s studies of water, vortices, and deluges, in one of which
water from a single source pours into a turbulent pool producing a 
swarm of swirls ejecting flows in all directions . . . We can imagine 
maximally intense activities in terms of water pouring in from all 
directions producing swarms of almost Cartesian vortices, then ejecting 
flows in all directions, to begin the cycle again. The University of 
Beauty is dedicated to the cause of releasing the lines of that intense 
graph, the powerful turbulent flows which Leonardo depicts, sometimes 
even breaking apart mountains. . .14
Within such a vision, study comes to be characterised in terms of intense 
fascination in the work at hand. This disrupts, indeed renders ridiculous, any 
attempt tidily and exhaustively to specify learning outcomes or curricular 
objectives. It exposes the poverty of the way that ICT in education has, contrary 
to its richer possibilities, tended to be understood – in effect as canned learning 
accessed by information skills. One can anticipate any number of ‘practical’ 
objections here. But what is so valuable is the finding of a language for that 
beauteous intensity that might be the quality of university study.
It is important that the kind of beauty that is at issue here is found across 
the range of academic engagement. For the argument bypasses the hackneyed 
dichotomies of liberal and vocational education, and of intrinsic and extrinsic 
value. Vocational education inevitably involves theory, practice, pleasure and 
function. In the building of a bridge or road connecting two communities, for 
example, there is a site of investigation that can be approached from multiple 
points of view: population flows, concrete chemistry, the aesthetics and physics 
of bridge design, costs to the communities and the social change it effects. 
It is simply a matter of not hiding this multiplicity of purposes behind 
the desire to seem either gruff and practical or sophisticated and 
theoretical. Unveiled, this multiplicity is a fine example of positive 
pointlessness, of beauty. Pointlessness is not to be restricted to the 
humanities, generalized or otherwise, it is the key to progress and 
excitement in every field.15
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Over the course of a life the importance of technical training fades while that of 
an inventive imagination increases. It is then our duty to encourage ‘those 
features of higher education (in whatever field) that ignite the fires of the 
imagination’, that burn with a fire that does not consume.16 Positive 
pointlessness, in any field, may be the secret to intensifying that imagination.
Ironically perhaps, there are signs of a libidinal charge in the closed 
economy that I have criticised – in its fetishisation of performance measures and 
in what has become its oppressive managerialism. And, ironically again, 
attempts to rehumanise the system by putting the learner at its heart reinforce 
precisely the self-absorption that is a barrier to the attention and objectivity I 
have advocated; they risk subsiding into a subjective indulgence, which is 
ultimately nihilistic. That these are correlates of a ressentiment that, in denying 
the good of education, suppresses and perverts its quality now becomes all the 
more plain to see.
Changing education
The point is not simply to dispense with relationships of exchange in education, 
absurd as this would indeed be. The point is to understand what happens when 
they obscure these deeper considerations, and to counteract the effects of this. It 
is when they are conditioned by the economies of excess delineated here that 
relationships of exchange can function well. 
There is no doubting the change that higher education has undergone in 
recent decades in many countries. Where this has been marked by widening 
participation, this is in many respects to be welcomed. Policy and practice in 
relation to this, in the UK especially, has been marked by two significant trends. 
The first of these is to be seen in the adoption of practices emanating from the 
further education sector, a sector more used to operating in this wider and 
typically more customer-orientated market. Universities have imported in a 
largely uncritical manner the managerial practices of that sector, honed as these 
have been on the managerialism of the past two decades. Yet they have largely 
ignored its success in reaching out to this wider range of students through the 
manner of its teaching. Some of the best practices I have described have been no 
less evident in that less high-profile sector.
The second concerns the ways in which many have seen ICT as the 
solution to the pressures of a mass system, with the major shift in the 
construction and patterns of delivery of the curriculum that this requires. This 
tends to be accompanied by blithe assumptions, to the neglect of evidence to the 
contrary, about the cost-effectiveness of ICT– assumptions that open the door 
wider to the adoption of precisely the canned learning criticised above. There 
are multiple and divergent possibilities within ICT, and these need to be 
assessed with far more subtlety and care if it is to play the beneficial part in 
higher education that it promises to do. A broad contrast can be drawn, 
however, that is relevant to the understanding of the current direction of policy 
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and practice. On the one hand, ICT has unparalleled potential for the storage 
and dissemination of information, whether through CD Rom technology or as 
online resources, and in this respect it models one aspect of the ‘knowledge 
economy’; but against this there is its tendency to play into naïve assumptions 
about teaching and learning, reinforcing understandings of knowledge as 
uniformly structured and more or less inert objects of consumption, and hence 
contributing to its commodification. On the other, the growth of the Internet has 
revealed new possibilities of communication and interaction, modelling in the 
process lateral and decentred networks of connection, indicative of a further 
aspect of the knowledge economy; but the negative side of this is the lack of 
order and control, epitomised by the chaotic nature of the World Wide Web. 
The divergence of these aspects of ICT in some ways symbolises, and 
may perhaps partly be the cause of, the current direction of higher education and 
a growing crisis in its self-understanding. This is most evident in its 
management and administration, but there are repercussions throughout the field 
of its operation, most importantly in teaching and learning. On the one hand, the 
virtues of networked activity and freedom of operation are extolled while, on 
the other, largely through the mechanism of funding, the centralising structures 
of bureaucratic control are reinforced. These are instabilities in relationships of 
exchange, and they are plainly not peculiar to any institution but endemic in the 
system. So long as thinking about higher education is confined with the 
economy of exchange, and hence so long as the understanding of what it is to 
teach and learn in a university is impoverished in this way, the confusion here is 
unlikely to be overcome.
The necessary reorientation of higher education will not be achieved 
without a better understanding of the nature of teaching and learning that is 
appropriate to it, and it is this that I have sought to provide. Against those who 
would rather be ‘gruff and practical’ and against those who believe we need a 
newly sophisticated theorisation of teaching and learning, the appeal here is to 
the kind of experience of higher education that many readers of this journal are 
likely to have had. While the prevailing conditions in the sector weigh against 
the approaches I have advocated, it is, of course, not the case that those working 
in universities merely acquiesce. Teachers have commonly been known to 
subvert the system, and university lecturers are in a stronger position to do this 
than many others. But, given the account I have provided, it is important to say 
just what academics should be doing. Let me conclude with some suggestions.
In the first place, there are implications for what is taught. The content 
of the curriculum should not be conceived as packages of information or finite 
bodies of knowledge, but always as opening up infinite possibilities for further 
enquiry. This will have an immediate practical effect on the topics, texts, 
problems that are chosen for the syllabus. Texts that are addressed should be 
such as to resist univocal reading; they should always capable of unsettling the 
student and provoking further thought. The manner of teaching itself – its 
method, if you like – should seek to open these possibilities of thought, in ways 
that are not always foreseeable. Hence while it is appropriate to plan what one is 
going to teach, this goes hand-in-hand with the readiness to respond to the 
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context of the particular class and a willingness develop the lesson according to 
the occasion. This does not rule out commitment to broad aims; it is a condition 
of properly honouring them. It follows also that assessment should be devised in 
such a way as to leave scope to the student’s developing thought. Far from 
being a soft option, this means keeping open throughout the course the demands 
that are made on students. For most courses it will also mean not attempting to 
specify in exhaustive detail the criteria for success. For some university teachers 
this may require thinking again about what ‘criteria’ and ‘standards’ properly 
mean, unlearning in the process the sense these terms have been given by 
regimes of performativity, and realising in the process the importance of 
traditions of enquiry and communities of scholarship in their being upheld and 
sustained. It follows furthermore that, in the manner in which they conceive of 
and undertake their own research, academics should be exemplars of the kinds 
of enthusiasm and commitment that I have attempted to describe.
Above all it is important to remember and resist the tendency of 
economies of exchange to colonise our thinking at all levels, and so to continue 
one’s work, as a teacher, a researcher or an administrator, in an understanding 
of the economies of excess that properly characterise the quality of higher 
education. There is much here that can be done within the present system. There 
is also strong evidence for ways in which it can be improved.
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